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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM: 
 
The defendant appeals from his conviction for two counts 
of receipt of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371 
and 2315. He alleges that the district court erred in 
denying his motion for a mistrial. For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm. 
 
The district court addressed the issue now before us in 
ruling upon the defendant's post-trial motions under Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 29(c) and 33, and we affirm substantially for the 
reasons set forth by the district court in its April 21, 1997 
memorandum. However, given the nature of the challenged 
prosecutorial conduct, we think it appropriate to 
supplement what the district court has already said about 
this case. 
 
I. 
 
Defendant and his codefendant, Morris Gershtein, each 
operated jewelry stores in "Jewelers Row" in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.1 The Government charged that the defendant 
and Gershtein entered into a relationship with Harold 
McCoy, whereby the latter would engage in a series of 
"smash and grab" robberies of jewelry stores in Virginia, 
North Carolina, Texas and elsewhere, and sell the proceeds 
of those robberies to defendant and Gershtein. McCoy was 
arrested in Texas for robbing a jewelry store there and 
transferred to Philadelphia, where he was charged in 
relation to several "smash and grab" robberies. Thereafter, 
McCoy entered into a plea agreement wherein he agreed to 
cooperate with the police in their investigation of Vaulin 
and Gershtein. As part of his cooperation McCoy wore a 
"body wire" and recorded conversations with Vaulin and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We need not set forth the facts in great detail as they are adequately 
summarized in the district court's memorandum opinion. We will, 
therefore, reiterate only those facts which are pertinent to the issue 
upon 
which we wish to elaborate. 
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Gershstein while selling them watches that appeared to 
have been stolen from other jewelry stores.2 Vaulin was 
arrested almost immediately after purchasing the watches 
from McCoy and proceeded to a jury trial jointly with 
Gershtein on the aforementioned charges. 
 
During the course of that trial, the Government called 
McCoy as a witness. On redirect examination, the Assistant 
United States Attorney asked McCoy whether he had 
received any threats while in prison because of his 
cooperation with the Government. McCoy answered that he 
received many death threats from inmates who are from 
Philadelphia. The prosecutor then asked McCoy why an 
inmate might threaten to kill him, but defense counsel 
objected and the court called counsel to sidebar because of 
its concern over the obvious dangers of this line of 
questioning. At sidebar, the prosecutor conceded that the 
threats did not come from Vaulin or Gershtein, and that 
these defendants had nothing to do with any threats. The 
court denied the defense motions for a mistrial, and asked 
the Government to clarify its question to eliminate any 
perceived connection between the threats and the 
defendants. The Assistant U.S. Attorney then asked McCoy: 
"You were threatened at Lewisburg but it had absolutely 
nothing to do with these defendants here, is that correct?" 
However, McCoy responded, "it was just basically-- 
directly, I am going to say no, not directly." App. at 124. 
Another sidebar ensued during which defendants renewed 
their motion for a mistrial fearing that McCoy's answer 
implied that the defendants had threatened McCoy 
indirectly. Nonetheless, the court once again denied that 
motion. 
 
Following this sidebar, the court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
 
       This is by way of clarification. At sidebar here, the 
       Government and the attorneys for the defendant 
       stipulated and agreed that these two defendants that 
       are in this courtroom on trial, had nothing whatsoever 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In actuality, the watches that he sold to the defendant and Gershtein 
were provided McCoy by the FBI for use in this sting operation. 
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       to do with any threats that this man may have 
       received. That is to be clarified and made clear. 
 
App. at 126. It is this exchange upon which we comment. 
 
II. 
 
It is obvious that this case is not like those cases 
exemplified by U.S. v. Gonzales, 703 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 
1993), in which evidence of a threat to a witness can be 
linked to a defendant and therefore tends to establish a 
defendant's consciousness of guilt. In that situation, "the 
probativeness of the death threat [outweighs] any danger of 
undue prejudice." Id. at 1223. Here, the Government 
concedes that none of the death threats that McCoy 
received came from either of the defendants who were on 
trial. Rather, the threats were apparently the result of a 
prison code that requires inmates to be antagonistic to any 
inmate who cooperates with the Government in criminal 
prosecutions. 
 
The Government attempts to justify its inquiry here by 
arguing that it was appropriate to bring out McCoy's 
concerns about remaining in prison in order to counter 
defense counsels' attempt to cross-examine McCoy about 
the "sweet deal he had made with the Government." See 
Appellee's Br. at 11. However, we are unpersuaded by the 
logic of this explanation. 
 
It goes without saying that persons in prison would 
prefer not to be there and may, therefore, avail themselves 
of an opportunity to reduce the amount of time they have 
to spend in prison whether or not they are receiving any 
threats while they are incarcerated. Thus, the fact of 
incarceration is, by itself, all that is needed for the average 
person to understand why anyone would enter into a 
"sweetheart deal" to shorten a period of incarceration. It 
also should go without saying that any prosecutor, 
regardless of his or her experience, ought to appreciate that 
when a cooperating witness is asked about death threats 
that he or she has received while in prison, a reasonable 
juror might readily assume that the defendant is behind 
such threats. Common sense would cause a juror to 
wonder why else the prosecutor would ask such a question. 
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Accordingly, the prosecutor's opening of Pandora's box here 
is as improper as it is ill advised. It invited the jury to 
return a verdict based upon an inappropriate and 
erroneous assumption, and then beckoned to them to 
accept that invitation by exercising the common sense that 
most trial courts instruct them to utilize while deliberating. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as follows: 
 
       evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
       any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
       the action more probable or less probable than it would 
       be without the evidence. 
 
Despite the instant prosecutor's assertion to the contrary, 
we are hard pressed to see how, under the circumstances 
here, evidence that an inmate received death threats that 
are no way connected to a defendant on trial is relevant 
during the course of that defendant's trial. 
 
This inquiry may have had some highly attenuated, 
theoretical relevance, because it bolstered the prosecutor's 
argument that the witness would rather have been outside 
of prison than inside of it. However, even assuming that 
such an argument would allow these questions to survive 
scrutiny under Rule 401, they still would fail the balancing 
test imposed by Fed. R. Evid. 403. The probative value is so 
minimal and the risk of prejudice so certain that it fails 
that test. The district court correctly sustained the defense 
objection to it. 
 
The Government attempts to justify the questions 
regarding death threats by relying upon U.S. v. 
Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 463 
U.S. 1210 (1983), and U.S. v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211, 235 
(3d Cir. 1990) vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1001 
(1990). See Appellee's Br. at 11-12. However, our holdings 
in those cases do not ameliorate our concern over what the 
prosecutor did here. In both Vastola and Frankenberry, the 
fear that raised the spectre of undue prejudice was 
testimony that was elicited to explain a witness's 
participation in the Witness Protection Program. Although 
participation in that program can, under some 
circumstances, unfairly suggest a defendant's 
dangerousness to a jury, that was not the situation in 
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either of those cases. Moreover, in Frankenberry, evidence 
of the witness's participation in the Witness Protection 
Program was relevant to explain to the jury that the 
Government was financially aiding the witness and 
conferring a benefit upon him. Thus, it was not only 
appropriate for this testimony to be elicited by the 
prosecutor, it was advisable and perhaps even required. We 
emphasized that "[t]he government explains that it elicited 
[the witness's] testimony . . . because it was relevant that it 
was financially aiding him and to rebut any inference that 
the government was buying his testimony." Id. at 239. In 
Vastola, we cited Frankenberry and noted that even when 
such evidence is admissible, it "is a matter that must be 
handled delicately." 899 F.2d at 234. The circumstances of 
this prosecution fell short of the mark needed to justify 
eliciting testimony from which a jury would infer a 
defendant's dangerousness. 
 
Nevertheless, for the reasons stated by the district court, 
we do not believe that this line of questioning supports the 
defendant's request for a new trial. As noted above, the trial 
judge immediately gave a strong curative instruction 
informing the jury that the defendants "had nothing 
whatsoever to do with any threats" that the witness had 
received. Although there are cases where the strongest of 
curative instructions remains insufficient to"unring" the 
bell, we do not believe that McCoy's testimony is such that 
any prejudice that resulted from it was not eliminated by 
the district court's immediate, direct, and insightful action. 
"We must presume that a jury will follow an instruction to 
disregard inadmissible evidence . . . unless there is an 
overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to 
follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that 
the impact of the evidence would be devastating to the 
defendant." U.S. v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
Moreover, after the question was asked, and the curative 
instruction given, the prosecutor did not return to the 
subject nor attempt to exploit McCoy's answer to the 
questions. The district court did not conclude that the 
prosecutor engaged in intentional misconduct in asking 
these questions and this record does not cause us to 
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disagree with that conclusion. Nevertheless, we would hope 
that, in the future, the Government would exercise better 
judgment in conducting an examination of a witness such 
as McCoy and would not bring out this kind of testimony 
unless it is relevant to some issue in the case. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the 
memorandum of the district court, we will affirm the 
judgment of conviction. 
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